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Abstract—The steady increase in the volume of indicators of
compromise (IoC) as well as their volatile nature makes their
processing challenging. Once compromised infrastructures are
cleaned up, threat actors are moving to on to other target
infrastructures or simply changing attack strategies. To ease
the evaluation of IoCs as well as to harness the combined
analysis capabilities, threat intelligence sharing platforms were
introduced in order to foster collaboration on a community level.
In this paper, the open-source threat intelligence platform MISP
is used to implement and showcase a generic scoring model for
decaying IoCs shared within MISP communities matching their
heterogeneous objectives. The model takes into account existing
meta-information shared along with indicators of compromise,
facilitating the decision making process for machines in regards
to the validity of the shared indicator of compromise. The model
is applied on common use-cases that are normally encountered
during incident response.
Keywords—Indicators of Compromise, Decay functions, Infor-
mation Sharing, Incident Response
I. INTRODUCTION
Information sharing platforms nowadays have become an
important tool in fighting active threats and a precious source
of information about the actual indicator of compromise lan-
scape. One of these platforms is MISP [25], an open source
threat intelligence sharing platform that enables various actors
from private or public IT-communities to share a wide range
of their information, may this be IoCs, malware or other
relevant data about existing threats. A particularity of MISP
is that it broke with the traditional ’single producer multiple
consumer’ paradigm that can commonly be observed in other
threat intelligence platforms and rather implements a peer to
peer architecture. Due to this, each participating member can
produce, enhance or consume information and give feedback
on information produced by others. Pieces of information can
be transfered along multiple nodes between partners. Hence,
the data quality and the trust of the data source is not always
certain. To provide a reliability and credibility measure to data
providers, some data interaction models are applied, as for
example taxonomies.
By giving data context, such as descriptions or adding
attributes, raw data becomes precious information for others.
Data is volatile and thus becomes outdated or even invalid,
as for example, compromised machines get cleaned up or
reused, IP addresses can change or domain names can be
deleted. Therefore a model is proposed which uses the existing
shared pool of data, matching the various, diverse objectives
of community members, such as operational network security
or threat intelligence along with community defined metrics
and classifications to scope the lifecycle of IoCs for various
use-cases.
The paper is organized as follows, section II discusses
relevant approaches focussing on threat intelligence collection,
processing and sharing. Section III introduces to MISP and
describes this platform in general and its data interaction
models. In section IV attribute scoring methods are introduced
to the reader. Since the research is still ongoing, some future
work and conclusions will be presented in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Sharing indicators of compromise within a community can
have a direct impact on the reaction times to an actual threat.
Research in cybersecurity shows that information sharing
within a community is one of the key factors to accurate
incident response, as shown in the study of [11]. Recurring
problems with information sharing include the fact that it is
a collective effort based on a give-and-take approach [10].
Another major concern is the quality of information, especially
when it comes to achieving low false positive rates. Having
reliable information is a major concern in information sharing
as described in article [6], where a concept of knowledge man-
agement is introduced to assess requirements for information
sharing tools. The authors of [4] describe similar requirements
by identifying challenges for threat intelligence platforms, as
for example privacy or quality control approaches. For this,
the authors of article [15] introduce an assessment approach
for malware threat levels referring to scoring and weighting
factors. Other authors, such as those in article [27] apply a
data mining approach to identify similarity metrics in statistical
relations for shared information. A data-driven visualisation
approach is presented in article [1], which evaluates content
from news and social media based on emotions to increase the
added value of information.
Event detection and evaluation are complex tasks, where
in intrusion detection it is often referred to as threshold-
based methods for triggering alarms, such as presented in
articles [12] [17]. Threshold-based detection are considered as
reliable and is often applied in statistics, data mining or game-
theoretical evaluation approaches [2] [9] [13] [20]. Beside
the evaluation techniques of data, the data itself provides a
large amount of information, such as IP-addresses, protocols,
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timestamps, etc, that play a major role in information sharing
and a lot of evaluation techniques are investigated [8] [18]
[26].
In the area of IoC tracing and evaluation, various ap-
proaches exist, from analysing technical articles or blog entries
to the deep analysis of samples to extract IoC information.
Technical focus is given in [22], where malware samples
are evaluated in order to output IoCs by analysing traffic
information. In article [21] IoCs are automatically extracted
from different sources, such as reports, articles, etc. and
evaluated using convolutional neural networks to correlate data
with other indicators in order to set up rules to be deployed
in a network. A similar idea was presented in article [14] that
studies technical articles and blog entries, but here, natural
language processing schemes are applied to evaluate data and
to identify decay times for observed IoCs in text appearances.
III. BACKGROUND AND DATA INTERACTION TECHNIQUES
IN MISP
The MISP software is introduced in this section with the
focus on the features used in the scoring model presented
in section IV. For a detailed description of the design and
implementation of MISP, we refer the reader to article [25].
MISP is an open-source threat information sharing platform,
where information on all kinds of threats can be shared within
communities or subsets of community members. Such pieces
of information can typically include indicators of compromise
such as IP addresses and file hashes, but also other types of
indicators such as financial indicators can be shared within
communities or a subset of them.
Users can decide on the granularity of information they
wish to disclose in MISP by sharing only some subsets
of the information package. The sharing level can also be
set, using the following levels: organisation only, the current
community, directly inter-connected communities, managed
distribution lists via ”sharing groups”, or simply all available
communities. With the distribution level set to organisation
only, the information is kept exclusively for the organisation of
the information producer. Community only allows the sharing
of information among all members of the given MISP instance.
Data marked as connected communities will be made available
to all users of the given MISP instance along with all members
of any MISP that has a direct link to the current instance. For
more complex sharing scenarios, sharing groups allow users to
create reusable or ad hoc groups, including a list of defined,
involved partners. Popular examples for sharing groups are
organisations grouped by business sectors such as actors within
the telecom sector or financial sector. Information can also
travel through N hops such as the connected communities
and their connected communities etc when the sharing level
is set to all. Hence, MISP uses a peer to peer architecture.
Three methods of synchronization exist between connected
MISP instances: push, pull and cherry pick. In the last method,
administrators can manually pick the events from a connected
MISP instance they want to share within their own community.
In MISP shared events can be populated with one of
140 different types of attributes (destination IP addresses,
file hashes) as well as a list of community developed object
templates, combining clusters of linked attributes into logical
containers.
Attributes themselves can be defined as a tuple of (category,
type, value), conveying both direct actionable data as well as
its associated context. Additional contextual information such
as the date, threat level, description, organisation, and higher
level information such as that on threat actors among others
can also be attached to events. Consumers have the possibility
to create proposals, which pending the producer’s validation
can become attributes. Communication between participants
can happen through the built in discussion system. Events can
be filtered according to the various taxonomies described via
the standard format defined in the IETF document [7].
A taxonomy in MISP is based on the machine-tag ap-
proach with triple-tags for representing semantic information.
The method was introduced by Flickr for the geolocation of
pictures [24]. The triple-tag syntax is a simple expression that
has a namespace, a predicate and a value, as shown in the
following example: {nato : classification = ’NU’}, this means
that nato is the namespace, classification is the predicate and
’NU’ the value.
The public repository1 with MISP taxonomies includes 47
different taxonomies for the domains of law enforcement, com-
puter security incident response team (CSIRT) classifications,
intelligence and many more. Each community can define their
own taxonomy explaining the growing of used taxonomies.
Intrusion detection systems can also import the latest signa-
tures from MISP and integrate them in their detection rule
set. Some intrusion detection systems can be instrumented to
sent a REST (REpresentational State Transfer) request towards
MISP with feedback about its detections. This feedback is
called sighting. Thus, knowledge can be gathered about the
validity, freshness of an information or its impact. A typical
example is an IP address of a compromised website distribut-
ing malware or acting as command and control server which is
cleaned up after a while. In MISP the concept of detection and
sighting is applicable for almost all kind of attributes. Hence,
it can be used by host intrusion detection systems capable
of detecting malicious files. Accounting software was also
observed capable of fetching bank accounts of money mules
from MISP for warning accountants in case of wire transfers
towards those. These automated mechanisms are possible due
to the API (Application Programming Interface) that is heavily
used by third parties. At the moment of writing 28 known tools
are capable of interacting with MISP such as Splunk, McAfee,
TheHive2.
The main reason to present the approach of sightings and
taxonomies in this section is that they play a major role as
parameters in the scoring model presented in section IV.
IV. SCORING INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
To illustrate the challenges within MISP communities and
the need for a scoring model for attributes, this section will
highlight some numbers extracted from our community we
operate for the private sector [5].
In its early operation in 2012, the users knew each other
and the trust and data quality was granted in an implicit
way. In January 2018, this community contains 1646 users
1https://github.com/MISP/misp-taxonomies
2http://www.misp-project.org/tools/
from 845 organizations and it is almost impossible that each
users know each other, such that there is no explicit trust.
The more, the objectives from each user are different. Users
consuming events for operational security including blocking
actions do not want to have false positives. People performing
threat intelligence activities by correlating indicators of various
threat actors want to have a maximum of indicators and even
want information about false positives as they give indica-
tions about the dynamics between theat actors and defenders.
Hence, these organizations need reliable historical data. The
correlation feature of MISP is a major driving incentive for
sharing information. Producers see whether other organizations
encountered the same threats. At the time of writing, the
users shared 8686 events having 1048405 attributes. 260896
correlations are found giving the users incentives to share
information. They can find out if other organizations were also
targeted. The data interaction methods start to grow as 54347
proposals are active and 407 discussion posts are created. This
community includes 8 sighting sources ranging from incident
response systems to honeypots giving both indications about
the freshness of information. In total 10219 sightings were
recorded including 30 confirmed false positives.
The lifetime of the various available attributes are not
homogeneous. For example, machines cleaned, IP addresses
changes up, IP addresses or domain names are traded and get
used in different fashions over time. Hence, each attribute has
its own decay function. File hashes usually tend not to vary
over time. Nevertheless, a shared file hash can be declared
as false positive over time by organizations with distinct trust
and knowledge levels. An example a legitimate file that was
embedded in a malware.
The scoring model for IoCs
Hence, a model of scores per attribute is selected including
the following conditions:
• The base score of an attribute (a), called base scorea,
is a weighting of the confidence of its source and its
linked taxonomies (x). It is the initial value of the life
cycle of an indicator. To this value, the score is reset
upon a new sighting.
• The elapsed time an attribute was seen first and seen
last.
• The end-time of an attribute τa represents the time at
which the overall score should be 0.
• The decay rate δa represents the speed at which
the overall score is decreasing over time. The decay
speed is variable over time as motivated in the follow-
ing example:
The decay rate of the IP should be low in the first
hours, but should go faster the more time passes. The
first time activities from this IP are sighted, the better
chances are that the threat actors are still active or are
executing follow up operations. When this IP address
is shared among a community targeted by the threat
actors, more and more members can take measures,
such as blocking the IP address. Hence, the attack
becomes ineffective forcing threat actors to use other
IP addresses. In case, the IP is given up, it could
be reassigned to a legitimate customer of the Internet
service provider leading to collateral damage due to
the blocking actions of this IP.
Information about threats are produced in a collaborative
manner using the data annotation and interaction techniques
described in section III. Tags can be added to events by
producers and are defined in a taxonomy. Some taxonomies
enable to express their confidence or reliability of a source
regarding a given piece of information they are attached to.
Consumers get this information and have different levels of
trust in the producers.
The basescorea for an attribute is defined in equation 1,
base score ∈ [0, 100]. It represents the score of an attribute
before taking into account its decay. It is composed of its
weighted applied tags and its source confidence.
The weights of the applied taxonomies are defined at
predicate level of each taxonomy and represent its acceptance
within a community. For instance, if tags from the taxonomy
with the namespace admiralty-scale and with the pred-
icate source-reliability are hardly used, it gets a low
weight. However, if within the same taxonomy tags with the
predicate information-credibility are regularly used,
it gets a higher weight.
The source confidence can also be influenced by an addi-
tional parameter called ωsc. This parameter takes into account
more subtle trust evaluations. For example, it could be that
an organization has a good image and a good reputation but
due to some circumstances within a given time frame, the
trust in this organization is decreased. A practical example
is an organization that was compromised or taken over by the
attacking party.
base scorea = weightx·tags+ωsc·source confidence (1)
The base scorea is defined in equation 1 with,
• ∀weightx ∈ [0, 100] ,∀ωsc ∈ [0, 100] , weightx +
ωsc = 100, weightx = 100 or ωsc = 100, a mean
to adjust the focus either on the tags or on the
source confidence. As little research on the trust
rebalancing and trust evolution of organizations in
distributed threat sharing is done, the ωsc parameter
is set to 100 − weightx and is considered as future
work implying further research.
• tags ∈ [0, 1] is the score derived from the taxonomies
and is defined in equation 2.
• source confidence ∈ [0, 1], is the confidence
given to the source that published the attribute. The
source confidence parameter in equation 1 gives a
possibility to influence the base score, which should
be a number between 0 and 100. Each source between
1 and N has its source confidence level. In case a
source is fully trusted the source confidence is set
to 1. If there is no trust, the source level is set to
0. The user could also set intermediate values, which
could give an estimate on how reliable the source is.
The learning of the confidence of a source based on
Description Value(s) Description Value(s)
Misp OSINT
Completely confident 100 Certain 100
Usually confident 75 Almost certain 93
Fairly confident 50 Probable 75
Rarely confident 25 Chances about even 50
Unconfident 0 Probably not 30
Impossibility 0
TABLE I. MISP AND OSINT TAXONOMIES
its produced information over time is subject to future
research.
The relevant taxonomies are summarized in table I.
The MISP taxonomy includes also a confidence level
that is set to ‘Confidence cannot be evaluated’. This special
confidence level cannot be mapped to a numerical value. One
possibility is to introduce the concept of ‘undefined’.
Once a value is undefined, the base score cannot be
computed and becomes undefined. At the end, the overall
score would be undefined and by this, cancel other scoring
factors defined in tags. Hence, when the confidence level is
”Confidence cannot be evaluated”, it will be ignored.
The score derived from the taxonomies is defined in equation
2, where G is the number of defined taxonomy groups and
T the number of used taxonomy per group. The weights are
defined at predicate level in the taxonomies and should be
integer numbers between 0 and 100.
tags =
∑j=G
j=1
∑i=T
i=1 taxonomyi · weighti∑j=G
j=1
∑i=T
i=1 100 · weighti
(2)
The idea is to decrease the base score over time. When
it reaches zero, the related indicator can be discarded. A first
idea to express the overall score could be to use equation 3.
scorea = base_score− δa(Tt − Tt−1) (3)
where,
• base scorea ∈ [0, 100] is described in equation 1.
• δa ∈ [0,+∞ represents the decay rate, or expressed as
the speed at which the score of an attribute decreases
over time.
• Tt and Tt−1 are timestamps. Tt represents the current
time and Tt−1 represents the last time this attribute
received from a sightings. It is assumed that Tt >
Tt−1.
Figure 1 shows the decay of the score of an attribute with
a base_score of 80 and a decay rate δa of 2.
An evaluation of the parameters shows that neither the end-
time nor the variable decay rate can be controlled. Indeed, by
fixing the decay rate, the end-time cannot be specified of the
score of an attribute. In the same mind, even if the decay rate
is controlled by the constant δa, the decay is fixed over time.
To address the latter point, an exponential degression could
be considered as shown in equation 4.
Fig. 1. scorea = base_score−δa(Tt−Tt−1). The decay of the score
is constant.
Fig. 2. scorea = base_score · e−δa·t. The decay of the score follows
an exponential degression.
scorea = base scorea · e−δa·t (4)
In this case a variable decay rate can be used. The slope
in figure 2 is high at the beginning and lower as time passes.
However, the decay rate cannot be significantly influenced.
This expression cannot be used to have a slow decay at the
beginning followed by a rapid degression. A behavior that can,
for example, be found in dynamic IP address allocation by
threat actors as previously described in this section. Moreover,
the time at which the overall score of the attribute should be
0 is entirely defined by the decay rate. So, manipulating the
slope as well as the end-time at the same time is still not
possible. Furthermore, it can be observed that the choice of
the parameter δa will essentially range between 0 and 1 due
to the tendency of the exponential degression to rapidly tend
to 0.
The final score is defined in equation 5, capturing the
conditions stated previously.
scorea = base_score ·
(
1−
(
t
τa
) 1
δa
)
(5)
with
Fig. 3. scorea = base_score ·
(
1−
(
t
τa
) 1
δa
)
for a fixed τa of 7
days
• δa ∈ ]0,+∞ , the decay speed.
• τa ∈ ]0,+∞ , the end-time or time needed such
that scorea = 0. The end-time can be told by
an expiration sighting, where an organization knows
when an indicator will be expired. An example is
the grace time: an Internet service provider gives a
grace time to customers to fix their machine until dis-
connecting them or law enforcement agencies seizing
the equipments. It can also be derived from existing
regular sightings, where organizations provided data
about sightings from the past.
• t = Tt − Tt−1, is an integer > 0
This polynomial function has two advantages over the
exponential one. First, the end-time with τa can be easily
controlled. Second, the direction direction of the cavity of the
slope can also be controlled. A fast degression at the beginning
can be obtained followed by a slow degression along with the
complete opposite. An example for a different decay rate δa
can be seen in figure 3. It can be seen that the greater δa is,
the faster the overall score decreases at the beginning. The
more, the closer δa is to zero, the slower the overall score will
decrease at the start. The score is 0 for all decay rate for the
specified τa.
The parameters can be easily be fine tuned which is an
additional advantage. A value can be set for each type of
attribute by performing a statistical analysis on an existing
dataset or users could set their own values via a dedicated
interface.
Two examples are shown how the score in equation 5 can
be used. The first example is an attribute for a compromised
IP address being part of a botnet. The attribute of a shared
event in MISP belongs to the category Network activity
with its type ip-dest, meaning the destination IP address
of a compromised webserver hosting an exploitkit distributing
malware. Some organizations spotted it and started to share
information about it. Abuse teams are informed to cleanup
the compromised systems. The IP address is encoded in
publicly available blacklists. The threat actors might notice
the detection too and start to move their exploitkit to another
webserver. If we assume that the Internet service provider
Fig. 4. scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
7·24
) 1
0.55
)
- It can be seen a rapid decrease
of the score at the beginning. The score is halved after 48 hours.
gives a customer 1 week time to fix the webserver. If it is
not fixed within this time frame, the IP of the webserver
will be null-routed, meaning that it will not be accessible any
more. Hence, τa = 7 · 24 hours. Under the hypothesis that the
typical blacklists take 48 hours to be applied in proxy servers
or browsers, the overall score should be halved after 2 days.
Hence, δa = 0.55. Finally, if the base score of the attribute is
calculated to be base_score= 80 (based on the taxonomies
and source confidence), equation 5 becomes:
scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
7 · 24
) 1
0.55
)
where t is the time between now and the last sighting,
expressed in hours. A plot of the decay is represented in figure
4.
The second example is the hash of a malware. If the hash is
not a false positive and a confirmed malware it says a malware
and should not be decayed. However, some host intrusion
detection systems cannot handle million of hashes. It could
be considered that the attribute will not have any value after 2
months, with a rather slow decay if this is the expected time
to destroy the attacking infrastructure. τa = 2 · 30 days and
δa = 0.3. It is also supposed that the base score is the same
as the previous example: base_score= 80. We have:
scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
2 · 30
) 1
0.3
)
and the resulting plot can be seen in figure 5.
V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a work in progress for a scoring
approach for evaluating the decay methods of indicators of
compromise that are shared within threat intelligence plat-
forms. The model is designed for the peer to peer threat
intelligence platform MISP taking into account existing data
annotations and data interaction methods. Taxonomies attached
to attributes are used in order to get information about reliabil-
ity and confidence organizations have in a given information
source. Each member organization can produce or consume
information, even consume information from multiple hops
Fig. 5. scorea = 80 ·
(
1−
(
t
2·30
) 1
0.3
)
- A really slow decrease at the
beginning and a rush towards zero at the end can be observed. The overall
score is halved in 48 days only.
away. The precondition in this case is that an information
consumer trusts the information producer. Since the MISP
platform grew organically from a handful interconnected MISP
instances, where members from the various communities knew
and trusted each other, to a large interconnected community
having lots of MISP instances in place. By this, nowadays, it
is not unlikely that a given information transits more MISP
instances and only little information known about the source
and its producer. This is a major drawback, because fake infor-
mation can be shared for harming an organization or to disrupt
the sharing communities. To counter this, another future work
will be the investigation of distributed information sharing
with game theoretical approaches, where detailed adversary
models for peer to peer threat sharing will be studied. Future
research activities include the study of various models for
the source confidence. Here, evaluations will focus most
probably on the different machine learning techniques. For
this, the model presented in section IV in this paper has to
be fully operational in order to collect a data about sharing
behaviours.
This work is co-financed by the European Union under the
CEF grant 2016-LU-IA-0098.
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